24 Then Jesus said to His disciples, “If anyone desires to come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me. 25 For whoever desires to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for My sake will find it.
The Quranic verses with full of wisdom mentioned in Part 2 of this article are the direct words from the author of the Quran, the non-existing Allah – the shadow of Muhammad. Similarly, there are countless hadiths, believed to be the voice of the prophet of Islam, speak volumes about camels. The volume of those hadiths are too large to discuss them all in a short article. The following are a small fraction of the hadiths on camels from the most authentic ‘Sahih Siththa’ hadith scriptures. These being the direct words of Prophet Muhammad on camels make him a perfect cameleer, like his Allah.
CAMELS VS BEDOUINS AND MUHAMMAD
To be noted that this article highlights the importance of camels in Islam as per its scriptures. It is equally important to know about the Bedouins of the Arabian desert, who were actually the owners of camels. After gold and silver, Muhammad concentrated on camels which were another major source of liquid wealth in the then Arab society. And Muhammad wanted to use the innocent Bedouins as pawns in his mission to accumulate wealth and power.
Places of camels are places of Satan, places of sheep are places of blessing
The Messenger of Allah (peace_be_upon_him) was asked about saying prayer in places where the camels lie down. He replied: Do not offer prayer in places where the camels lie down. These are the places of Satan. He was asked about saying prayer in the sheepfolds. He replied: You may offer prayer in such places; these are the places of blessing. (Abu Dawud 1:184, Sahih Muslim 3:700)
Yahya related to me from Malik from Hisham ibn Urwa from his father that one of the muhajirun in whom he saw no harm asked Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-As, "Can I pray in a place where camels are watered?" Abdullah replied, "No, but you can pray in a sheep-pen." (Malik 9/9.23.82)
These two hadiths speaks unfavorably about camels. Why would Muhammad speak oddly about camels, when camels were to be one of his major sources of wealth? He never spoke unfavorably about anything that benefited him. Likewise Muhammad never said anything against his wealthy companions, such as Abdur Raman bin Awf, Abu Bakr, Uthman and others. Then why against camels? Muhammad’s every action has its background.
In the Arab desert, Bedouins were the owners of camels. They used to live in the interior of the desert without proper shelters for them. Their major sources of livelihood were camels. They sold the camels and their meat to the urbanized Arabs. In return, they accepted goods from the urban people needed for their day-to-day life. The urban populations were businessmen. They owned sheep. During the first thirteen years of his so-called prophethood, Muhammad had very little success in attracting the people of his urban community to his mission. Around seventy-odd persons pledged allegiance to his now cult during those thirteen years. And they were mainly from his close relatives, friends and slaves belonging to rich Meccans. The clever supporters from his urban community understood the motivation behind Muhammad’s mission and were waiting to have their pound of flesh without risking their life. Muhammad was also not willing to lose them. He could only spare the black slaves whom he had purchased with the wealth of Khadija and his dedicated friend Abu Bakr.
When Muhammad migrated to Medina at the age of 53, he was realizing that time was running out for him to became the ruler of the Arabs. He was in a hurry to find people whom he could use as warriors to die for his cause. He approached the desert Bedouins to join his mission and to fight against the infidels. The Bedouins understood his real intention that he wanted to use them as pawn to fulfill his ambitions, and rejected his call. Muhammad was quick-prone to intolerance, and the above-mentioned hadiths are the reflection of the same. There are oceans of hadiths to prove his intolerance. Muhammad was brilliant in doing evils. So, he sanctioned trade embargo with the Bedouins.
MUHAMMAD SCOLDED THE BEDOUINS AND SANCTIONED TRADE EMBARGO ON THEM
Some of Muhammad’s actions identify him as a practical joker, and at the same time evil person. Muhammad’s anger was not actually toward camels, but toward their owners, who wanted to live a peaceful life with their camel-herding business. So, Muhammad initially started scolding the camels and then the came owners:
Owners of the camels (Bedouins) are rude: Narrated abu huraira: the prophet said, "the people of Yemen have come to you and they are more gentle and soft-hearted. Belief is Yemenite and Wisdom is Yemenite, while pride and haughtiness are the qualities of the owners of camels (i.e. Bedouins). Calmness and solemnity are the characters of the owners of sheep." (Sahih al-Bukhari 5:59:671,673, 4:56:703)
Don’t sell goods to Bedouins: Anas b. Malik (Allah be pleased with him) reported: We were forbidden that a townsman should sell for a man of the desert, even if he is his brothers or father. (Muslim 10:3632)
Don’t buy meat slaughtered by bedouins: Narrated abdullah ibn abbas: the apostle of allah (peace be upon him) forbade to eat (the meat of animals) slaughtered by the Bedouins for vainglory and pride. (Dawud 15:2814)
And the trade embargo that Muhammad imposed on the innocent Bedouins fetched good results to him as the poorest among the Bedouins started approaching him to join his cult. Encouraged by the move of those Bedouins, Muhammad too promised enormous rewards for them in the afterlife if they fight in his cause (of course for Allah) as well as to enrich them handsomely with plundered booty and captured women in this life. The concept of lavish sexual orgy-filled Islamic paradise was invented especially to deceive those poor Bedouins. For the Bedouins of the interior deserts, who knew nothing but hardships in the extreme weather conditions of the desert, the lavishness of the Muhammad’s paradise was a perfect bait.
The Bedouins used to spend their time in taming camels, their primary and indispensable source of livelihood. Muhammad wanted to divert their attention from their favorite craft and involve them in his training camp activities (i.e. his mosque, next to his house), where he gave training to his fighters for jihad raids. To that end, Muhammad now equated the Quran with camels.
The value of one verse of the Quran equals to one she-camel: The prophet of Islam said, “does not one of you go out in the morning to the mosque and teach or recite two verses from the book of allah; the majestic and glorious? That is better for him than two she-camels, and three verses are better (than three she-camels). and four verses are better for him than four (she-camels), and to on their number in camels.” (Sahih Muslim 4:1756)
The purpose of this hadith was to convince the Bedouins that the Quran would fetch them similar benefits like that brought by camels, if they would dedicate to the Quran's dictates, including getting trained for participation in Jihad raids.
Muhammad not only compared the book of ‘Allah’ with camels, but also offered prayers in front of camel in pretension to show the Bedouins that he equally respected camels. From previously comparing camels with the Satan (Abu Dawud 1:184, Sahih Muslim 3:700, Malik 9:9.23.82), Muhammad now wanted to convince the Bedouins that his respect for camels equaled to that of Allah. It should be mentioned that Muhammad said prayers will be annulled if an ass, a dog, a pig, a Jew or a woman happened to pass in front of a praying person.
This shows how opportunist Muhammad was! When he hated the Bedouins for their initial refusal to join his cult, their camels became Satan to him. When they showed willingness to join him, the same camels became equal to Allah. Alhamdulilah!!
MUHAMMAD PRAYED IN FRONT OF CAMELS (SATAN)
Narrated Amr ibn Abasah: The Apostle of Allah (peace_be_upon_him) led us in prayer facing a camel which had been taken in booty,……. .” (Dawud 14:2749)
Narrated Nafi: "The Prophet used to make his she-camel sit across and he would pray facing it (as a Sutra)." I asked, "What would the Prophet do if the she-camel was provoked and moved?" He said, "He would take its camel-saddle and put it in front of him and pray facing its back part (as a Sutra). (Sahih Al-Bukhari 1:9:485)
(Note: The Arabic term ‘Sutra’ indicates a piece of stick that Muhammad invented to place in front of a praying person, if there is no wall to offer prayer in front of him.)
Muhammad also offered prayers sitting on the back of the Satan:
“……He said, 'The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to pray witr on his camel.' " (Malik 7:7.3.15)
Offering prayers in front of camels, aka the Satan, as mentioned in the above-cited hadiths was not rare incidents for Muhammad, but was his common practice.
And one need not panic about Muhammad's practice of offering prayers in front of the Satan (camel), because Muslims are already informed that they entercounter the Satan every time they enter the Mosque with the intention to offer prayers:
The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "When you stand in prayer, Shaytan comes to you and confuses you………." (Malik 4:4.1.1)
OBLIGATORY ISLAMIC TAX – 1 SHE-CAMEL FOR 40 CAMELS
After convincing the Bedouins to embrace his cult, Muhammad came out with his original agenda of enriching himself. He imposed tax in the name of Zakat on the converted Muslims. He collected only she-animals as tax (zakat) from Muslims, and snatched half of the property from whoever refused to pay tax to him:
Abu Bakr said, “Allah ordered Muhammad not to accept male goat; but she-goat as Zakat!” (Sahih Al-Bukhari 2:24:535)
PUNISHMENT FOR EVADING OBLIGATORY TAX (ZAKAT)
The Muslim tradition of paying zakat as supposed charity has no spiritual motivation. It was purely a government tax imposed by Muhammad on every Muslim, and one amongst the numerous ways Muhammad accumulated wealth. Muhammad punished Muslims for not paying tax (zakat) to the government by confiscating half of the wealth of the defaulter:
Narrated Mu'awiyah ibn Haydah: The Apostle of Allah (peace_be_upon_him) said: For forty pasturing camels, one she-camel in her third year is to be given. ……If anyone evades zakat, we shall take half the property from him as a due from the dues of our Lord, the Exalted….” (Dawud 9:1570)
This hadith has been narrated by Zaid b. Aslam with the same chain of transmitters except that he said: "None among the owners of camels who does not pay their due," but did not say" their due (Zakat) out of them." and he make a mention:" He did not miss a single young one out of them." and he said: “Their sides, their foreheads and their backs would be cauterised." (Sahih Muslim 5:2162)
The prophet of Islam was not satisfied with the punishment he dished out to zakat-evaders as mentioned in the hadiths above. He also condemned them to the sufferance of endless punishments in hell by the same animals. Here are a few hadiths specifying afterlife punishments for Zakat-evaders: Sahih Muslim 5:2161,2166-2167, Sahih Al-Bukhari 2:24:485,486,539. These are long hadiths, which readers can find on the Internet.
MUHAMMAD PUT SEAL MARKS ON HIS SHE-CAMELS FOR IDENTIFICATION
As the stock of his camels collected from the Bedouins under different excuses grew too large, Muhammad had difficulty in keeping track of them. So he put torturous seal-mark on them for identification:
“……the Prophet who was sitting in a garden and was wearing a Huraithiya Khamisa and was branding the she-camel on which he had come during the Conquest of Mecca. (Sahih Al-Bukhari 7:72:714)
Allah's Messenger called for his she-camel and marked it on the right side of its bump, removed the blood from it,…..” (Sahih Muslim 7:2865)
To know more about Muhammad and his companion’s ‘love’ for she-animals, please visit previous article.
HORRIFIC CONSEQUENCES OF STEALING MUHAMMAD’S CAMELS
Those who tried to steal Muhammad's camels and got caught had to suffer the most horrifying punishment one can imagine in our days and times. This would make it obvious why Muhammad went to the point of inflicting pailful torture on his camels by marking then by burning their skin.
Narrated Abu Qilaba: Anas said, "Some people of 'Ukl or 'Uraina tribe came to Medina and its climate did not suit them. So the Prophet ordered them to go to the herd of (Milch) camels and to drink their milk and urine (as a medicine). So they went as directed and after they became healthy, they killed the shepherd of the Prophet and drove away all the camels. The news reached the Prophet early in the morning and he sent (men) in their pursuit and they were captured and brought at noon. He then ordered to cut their hands and feet (and it was done), and their eyes were branded with heated pieces of iron, They were put in 'Al-Harra' and when they asked for water, no water was given to them." Abu Qilaba said, "Those people committed theft and murder, became infidels after embracing Islam and fought against Allah and His Apostle." (Bukhari 1:4:234)
Just because the offenders mentioned in above hadith were Bedouins from the desert and unrelated to Muhammad's family and tribe, they had to suffer such horrifically barbaric punishment at Muhammad's hand. Had they been from Muhammad’s family or tribe, their punishment could have been very different. In this regard, it can be mentioned that according to Islam, thieves, fornicators and even murderers are also entitled to enter paradise:
“…He (the Holy Prophet) said: It was Gabriel who met me by the side of the stony ground and said: Give glad tidings to your Ummah that he who died without associating ought with Allah would go into Paradise. I said: Gabriel, even if he committed theft and fornication? He said: Yes. I said: Even it he committed theft and fornication? He said: Yes, I again said: Even if he committed theft and fornication? He said: Yes, even if he drank wine. (Sahih Muslim 5:2175)
A Muslim cannot be killed for killing a non-Muslim. (Sahih Al-bukhari 1:3:111, 9:83:50)
CONCLUSION
Today every one is quick to condemn our politicians because of the dirty tricks they play. Muhammad as well played the art of the nasty politics in his time, and left behind a host of most evil political tricks for the politicians of all times to play. He compared camels to Satan out of frustration, and made the same camels as the object of prayer when it helped him deceive their owners. He was the greediest of the greedy and a power-hungry the world has ever known.
The art of deceiving the innocent desert Bedouins that Muhammad set in has not ended yet. The concluding part of this article will deal with the role of camels on the Day of Resurrection and the role of camels in heaven.
To sum up this part, Islam is nothing but a deception, and as part of that, Muhammad deceived the illiterate desert cameleers of his time.
Part 1 of this article dealt with the greed of Muhammad and his Sahaba, values of animals comparatively with human beings, especially with Muslim women, and the extent of Muhammad’s plunders etc. In Part 2, we will try to understand the similarities between camels and Muslims, and camels and Muhammad, as well as proofs that the author of the Quran is a cameleer etc.
CAMELS vs MUSLIMS IN GENERAL
Muhammad was fond of using abusive language, especially, on those peace-loving Muslims who embraced Islam in fear of being killed by him if not converted, and refused to go to raids with him for plundering non-Muslim communities. He branded them as ‘Munafiqs’, which means hypocrites. He also fabricated a bunch of verses in his Quran and numerous sayings in hadith scriptures, equating the Muslims to camels:
I heard Allah's Apostle saying, "People are just like camels, out of one hundred, one can hardly find a single camel suitable to ride." (Sahih Al-Bukhari 8:76:505)
“… You would find people like one hundred camels and you would not find even one (camel) fit for riding.” (Sahih Muslim 31:6179)
Why would the prophet of Islam expecting the people to be so ignorant in the first place, so that he can ride on them?
It is not Muhammad alone used the abusive language on people, but his imaginary creation Allah also used the abusive language on Muslims.
Allah is a cameleer and the Muslims are camels. (Sahih Muslim 37:6611,6618)
Muslims who doesn’t care to look into their own scriptures are more deserves to be called as camels by Muhammad and his shadow; Allah.
AISHA WAS STRUCK LIKE A CAMEL BY HER BROTHER
It is not just the ordinary Muslims were named as camels BY Allah and Muhammad, but the first lady of the Islamic regime and the mother of the faithful Aisha also felt it as simple to be compare herself to camels:
“……She ('A'isha) said: He (Aisha’s brother – Abd al-Rahman) seated me behind him on his camel. She (further) stated: I lifted my head covering and took it off from my neck. He struck my foot as if he was striking the camel. I said to him: Do you find anyone here? …..” (Sahih Muslim 7:2789)
Aisha is also recorded in Islamic scriptures to have been beaten repeatedly by her father Abu Bakr after her marriage to Muhammad. Her best husband Muhammad beat her too. It tells enough about the standard of family-values in Islam.
A BEAUTIFUL WOMAN RESEMBLES A ‘SHE-CAMEL’
Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) permitted temporary marriage for us. So I and another person went out and saw a woman of Banu 'Amir, who was like a young long-necked she-camel. (Sahih Muslim 8:3252,3258)
The above hadith states about Nikah al-Mut’a, which mean the ‘temporary marriage’. ‘Mut’a is the sanitized version of what is universally known as prostitution. Muhammad allowed this to his Sahaba while they are away from their families ‘striving hard’ on Allah’s path, i.e. doing Jihad.
CAMELS vs MUSLIM MEN IN PARTICULAR
There is no other divine reason for Muslims to marry four wives. They were constantly engaged in jihad raids on non-Muslims for their mafia boss and used to get killed during those raids. Naturally, Muhammad distributed the widows of the ‘martyred’ Muslims to the for-the-time-being living Muslim men in the name of marriage. If anyone starts scrutiny of the biographies of the women Sahabiyaat (women companions of Muhammad), it is easy to find the number of Muslim husbands they had during their lifetime, one after another, after the killing of their then husbands. Moreover, Muhammad considered the Muslim women as the incubators to produce warriors to expand the nation of Islam.
The following hadith is the hidden message to the Muslimas (Muslim women) of all times that it is quite natural among animals too to keep a ratio of four female to one male:
ONE MALE-CAMEL IS CAPABLE TO ‘MANAGE’ 4 SHE-CAMELS:
The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said: The blood-wit for accidental killing should be twenty she-camels which had entered their fourth year, twenty she-camels which had entered their fifth year, twenty she-camels which had entered their second year, twenty she-camels which had entered their third year, and twenty male camels which had entered their second year. It does not beyond Ibn Mas'ud. (Abu Dawud 39:4529)
MUSLIM MEN CAN MANAGE 4 WIVES:
“If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with orphans, marry women of your choice who seem good to you, two or three or four…….” (Quran 4:3)
CAMEL vs MUHAMMAD
ONE ‘ARISTOCRAT’ CAMEL CAN MANAGE NINE SHE CAMELS:
The Apostle of Allah (peace_be_upon_him) gave judgment that if anyone is killed accidentally, his blood-wit should be one hundred camels: thirty she-camels which had entered their second year, thirty she-camels which had entered their third year, thirty she-camels which had entered their fourth year, and ten male camels which had entered their third year. (Abu Daud 39:4526)
MUHAMMAD USED TO HAVE SEX WITH 9 WIVES IN 1 NIGHT:
At several occasions Muhammad had group sex with his 9 wives, who were present then, in the same night. (Sahih Al Bukhari 7:6)
‘HAM’ – THE SPECIAL CAMEL USED ONLY FOR COPULATION vs MUHAMMAD
Muhammad was not an ordinary man. He was the best and the last prophet of allah. He was given title of ‘Uswa al-Hasana’ & ‘Insan al-Kaamil’ which means the best and a complete man, so naturally, Allah must have decided everything about him extremely special. So, Allah give him the exception of having sex with any and as many Muslim women who give them to him in sex voluntarily and also the other women, whom his heart desires :
MUHAMMAD HAD SEX WITH NUMEROUS WOMEN:
"O Prophet! We have made lawful to you all the wives to whom you have paid dowers; and those whom your hands possess out of the prisoners of war spoils whom Allah has assigned to you; and daughters of your paternal uncles and aunts, and daughters of your uncles and aunts, who migrated with you; and any believing woman if the Prophet wishes her; this is a privilege for you only, and not for the rest of the Believers; We know what We have appointed for them as to their wives and the captives whom they possess; in order that there should be no difficulty for you and that you should be free from blame." (Quran 33:50)
Muhammad through convenient “revelations” from Allah entitled himself the rights and immunity that no other Muslim man ever received.
AISHA; THE REBELLIOUS AMONG 15 WIVES OPPOSED MUHAMMAD’S ACTIONS:
'A'isha (Allah be pleased with her) reported: I felt jealous of the women who offered themselves to Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) and said: Then when Allah, the Exalted and Glorious, revealed this:" You may defer any one of them you wish, and take to yourself any you wish; and if you desire any you have set aside (no sin is chargeable to you)" (xxxiii. 51), I ('A'isha.) said: It seems to me that your Lord hastens to satisfy your desire. (Sahih Muslim 8:3453, Sahih Al-Bukhari 6:60:311)
To shut the mouths of Aisha and the others, Muhammad needed the support of the following fable of ‘Ham’:
‘HAM’ (SPECIAL CAMEL) WITH NUMBER OF SHE-CAMELS:
Narrated Said bin Al-Musaiyab: “……..'Ham' was the male camel which was used for copulation. When it had finished the number of copulations assigned for it, they would let it loose for their idols and excuse it from burdens so that nothing would be carried on it, and they called it the 'Hami.' Abu Huraira said, "I heard the Prophet saying so.” (Sahih Al-Bukhari 6:60:147)
The above hadith speaks about the practice of taking our tamed she-animals to the male animal for copulation as and when required. Similar to the above hadith, Muhammad too was permitted in the Quran by Allah to do the job of the ‘special’ camel. The above ‘Ham’ camel hadith had been added to the hadith traditions, only to justify Muhammad’s deeds.
LENDING YOUR MALE CAMEL FOR MATING IS CHARITY
Muhammad’s sex ‘acts’ mentioned in the Quran and hadiths should not be misunderstood(!) and blamed as the act of sexual prejudices. In fact he was performing it on Muslim women as an act of charity. The following hadiths justifies how charitable ‘camel’ that Muhammad was:
“…….A man said: Messenger of Allah, what is due on camels? He said: ……lending its male for mating with a she-camel …….” (Sahih Muslim 5:2166)
Narrated AbuHurayrah: I heard the Apostle of Allah (peace_be_upon_him) as saying ……That you should give the best of your camels (in the path of Allah (i.e. Jihad) ………….. that you lend the stallion for covering….” (Abu Dawud 9:1656)
Moreover, Muhammad used to say in many hadiths that whoever drinks the leftover water of his will go to Jannah. In another hadith, Muhammad said to his foster mother Umm Aymaan alias Barakha, who dranked Muhammad’s urine by mistake that she will get rid of all her stomach ailments because of drinking of his urine.
Al Husay narrated : Umm Ayman (Barakah) said: One night the Prophet got up and urinated in the corner of the house into an earthenware vessel. During the night I got up, and being thirsty, I drank what was in the vessel, not noticing. When the Prophet got up in the morning, he said ‘O Umm Ayman, take that earthenware vessel and pour away its content.’ I said 'By God, I drank what was in it.’The Prophet laughed until his molar teeth showed, then he said ‘After this you will never have a bellyache’. (Al-Tabari 39:199) (This is Muhammad at his humble)
If Muhammad’s urine contains this kind of miraculous values then without any doubt, his holy semen too would have had superior values. After knowing these miracles, Muslim women of his time would have waiting in queue to get the semen of Muhammad in them. So, Muhammad did nothing wrong by enjoying the sexually, in fact he guaranteed the place for them in Jannah.
AISHA, THE UNGRAZED TREE & MUHAMMAD, A CAMEL TO GRAZE IT
Aisha; The mother of the believers and the child bride of Muhammad is the most respected woman among the Sunny Muslims and believe to be the modest of all women in Islam’s history. In fact she is the most immodest woman among the women of the Islamic scriptures. There are several hadiths to prove how ‘modest’ she was. The following is one of such water downed ‘modest’ hadith from Aisha; the most respectful mother of the believers:
Narrated 'Aisha : I said, "O Allah's Apostle! Suppose you landed in a valley where there is a tree of which something has been eaten and then you found trees of which nothing has been eaten, of which tree would you let your camel graze?" He said, "(I will let my camel graze) of the one of which nothing has been eaten before." (The sub-narrator added: 'Aisha meant that Allah's Apostle had not married a virgin besides herself.) (Sahih Al-Bukhari 7:62:14)
THE AUTHOR OF THE QURAN IS A CAMELEER
The following are the few verses taken from the ‘holy’ Quran that proves the level of intelligence of our all-knowing Allah and his care toward modern Muslims. Please read the verses carefully and decide yourself whether the author of the Quran is someone who is all-knowing, or he is merely a cameleer from the desert of Arabia. The geographical knowledge of the author of the Quran is so poor that he doesn’t know anything beyond the desert of Arabia and its neighboring area within the reach of his camel.
It is quite natural for a person to give references from the areas of his expertise in his quotes to simplify his arguments; so do a cameleer, to mention camels in his quotes. As one of a versatile cameleers, the author of the Quran used the examples of camels in most of his quotes. The word ‘camel’ was repeated 19 times in the Quran to give such references. The following few verses are taken from those verses that speaks about ‘camels’ for your reading pleasure:
1) Allah taking the credit and exclaims about his wondrous creation; the camel:
“Then do they not look at the camels – how they are created?” (Quran: 88:17)
So, the camels are the best and a complicated creation of Allah above all his creation, on which he feel proud; in contrast, our scientists are in a position to create it, simply by cloning.
2) One of the sign of the doomsday is that the owners of the she-camels will ignore to take care of his she-camel, while it was about to deliver a kid, because of the wrath of Allah on doomsday:
“And when full-term she-camels are neglected (sign of doomsday)” (Quran: 81:4)
To fulfill the idiotic prophecy of this verse, every one of us should tame a she-camel at our backyard so that we could neglect it on the day of resurrection.
3) The flames of the hell fire will be so furious that it will resemble the yellowish black camel:
“As if they (the flames of hell-fire) were yellowish (black) camels.” (Quran: 77:33)
4) Hot water will be delivered to the dwellers of the hell-fire to drink and it will eat their bowls. Even then they will drink it like thirsty camels, as they will be so thirsty:
“And (the dwellers of hellfire) will drink as the drinking of thirsty camels.” (Quran: 56:55)
5) It is easy to come to a conclusion after reading the Quran that it is copied from the Bible. Jesus, while pointing out the misers from the rich, he said that it is easier for the camel to enter in to the eye of the needle than for the rich to enter the Kingdom of God. (Matthew: 19:24). But Muhammad refrain to say anything against the rich as they are the investors to buy the ammunition for him. There are so many hadiths favoring the rich. Muhammad used the above plagiarized verse of the Bible for those poor desert Arabs, who refuse to go with him to raid the non-Muslims:
“Indeed, those who neglect our verses and arrogant toward them – the gates of Heaven will not open for them, nor they will enter the Paradise until a camel enters in to the eye of the needle.” (Quran: 7:40)
6) The most wise Allah expects the modern Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, to travel on camels from faraway places, may be from USA and Australia:
“And proclaim the people the hajj (pilgrimage); they will come to you on foot on every lean camel; they will come from every distant pass.” (Quran: 22:27)
So, the best means of travel to Mecca for hajj is camel ride.
7/ It is not possible for Allah to appear physically to prove his existence; so he sent a she-camel, as a best sign to prove his existence:
“And nothing has prevented us from sending signs except that the former peoples denied them. And we gave Thamud the she-camel as the visible sign, but they wronged her. And we send not the signs except as the warning.” (Quran 17:59)
The best sign that Allah could sent as his existence is his she-camel, and not the dinosaur.
8) Allah speaks about the camels not because of his affection towards them, but as the sign of wealth. So, in the early days of Islamic raids, Muhammad captured the livestock of the non-Muslims as much as he can to distribute among his bandits companions to make them financially sound:
“And the camels and cattle We have appointed for you as among the symbols of Allah ; for you therein is good. So mention the name of Allah upon them when lined up [for sacrifice]; and when they are [lifeless] on their sides, then eat from them and feed the needy and the beggar. Thus have We subjected them to you that you may be grateful.” (Quran 22:36)
All the above Quranic verses with full of wisdom, are the direct words from the author of the Quran; the non-existing Allah - the shadow of Muhammad. Similarly, there are countless hadiths, which are believed to be the voice of the prophet of Islam himself that speaks volumes about the camels. It is impossible to discuss all these hadiths in this tiny article due to its voluminous nature.
CONCLUSION
This part of article discussed about the lustful part of Muhammad and his Sahaba, and how he justified his nasty deeds comparing with the natural tendency of camel’s sex. And also how Allah; the all-knowing used camels to support his message, and with that the alleged author of the Quran Allah; proved himself to be a cameleer.
In the next part of this article, let us discuss few more traditions taken from that voluminous hadiths on camels that,
How Muhammad compared the Quran with camels,
And how the same Muhammad compared the Satan with camels,
What makes Muhammad to offer prayer in front of the supposed Satan (i.e. the camel),
The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it.
by Graeme Wood
What is the Islamic State?
Where did it come from, and what are its intentions? The simplicity of these questions can be deceiving, and few Western leaders seem to know the answers. In December, The New York Times published confidential comments by Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal. “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even understand the idea.” In the past year, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors.
The group seized Mosul, Iraq, last June, and already rules an area larger than the United Kingdom. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been its leader since May 2010, but until last summer, his most recent known appearance on film was a grainy mug shot from a stay in U.S. captivity at Camp Bucca during the occupation of Iraq. Then, on July 5 of last year, he stepped into the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, to deliver a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations—upgrading his resolution from grainy to high-definition, and his position from hunted guerrilla to commander of all Muslims. The inflow of jihadists that followed, from around the world, was unprecedented in its pace and volume, and is continuing.
Our ignorance of the Islamic State is in some ways understandable: It is a hermit kingdom; few have gone there and returned. Baghdadi has spoken on camera only once. But his address, and the Islamic State’s countless other propaganda videos and encyclicals, are online, and the caliphate’s supporters have toiled mightily to make their project knowable. We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.
The Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy, and can help the West know its enemy and predict its behavior. Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than like the realization of a dystopian alternate reality in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.
We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways. First, we tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al‑Qaeda to an organization that has decisively eclipsed it. The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to Osama bin Laden as “Sheikh Osama,” a title of honor. But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership.
Bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not expect to see in his lifetime. His organization was flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells. The Islamic State, by contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it. (Its bureaucracy is divided into civil and military arms, and its territory into provinces.)
We are misled in a second way, by a well-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State’s medieval religious nature. Peter Bergen, who produced the first interview with bin Laden in 1997, titled his first book Holy War, Inc. in part to acknowledge bin Laden as a creature of the modern secular world. Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently. On Mohammad Atta’s last full day of life, he shopped at Walmart and ate dinner at Pizza Hut.
Nearly all the Islamic State’s decisions adhere to what it calls, on its billboards, license plates, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology.”
There is a temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse.
The most-articulate spokesmen for that position are the Islamic State’s officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively to “moderns.” In conversation, they insist that they will not—cannot—waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often speak in codes and allusions that sound odd or old-fashioned to non-Muslims, but refer to specific traditions and texts of early Islam.
To take one example: In September, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the Islamic State’s chief spokesman, called on Muslims in Western countries such as France and Canada to find an infidel and “smash his head with a rock,” poison him, run him over with a car, or “destroy his crops.” To Western ears, the biblical-sounding punishments—the stoning and crop destruction—juxtaposed strangely with his more modern-sounding call to vehicular homicide. (As if to show that he could terrorize by imagery alone, Adnani also referred to Secretary of State John Kerry as an “uncircumcised geezer.”)
But Adnani was not merely talking trash. His speech was laced with theological and legal discussion, and his exhortation to attack crops directly echoed orders from Muhammad to leave well water and crops alone—unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position, in which case Muslims in the lands of kuffar, or infidels, should be unmerciful, and poison away.
The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.
Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology,” which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. We’ll need to get acquainted with the Islamic State’s intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead help it self-immolate in its own excessive zeal.
Control of territory is an essential precondition for the Islamic State’s authority in the eyes of its supporters. This map, adapted from the work of the Institute for the Study of War, shows the territory under the caliphate’s control as of January 15, along with areas it has attacked. Where it holds power, the state collects taxes, regulates prices, operates courts, and administers services ranging from health care and education to telecommunications.
I. Devotion
In November, the Islamic State released an infomercial-like video tracing its origins to bin Laden. It acknowledged Abu Musa’b al Zarqawi, the brutal head of al‑Qaeda in Iraq from roughly 2003 until his killing in 2006, as a more immediate progenitor, followed sequentially by two other guerrilla leaders before Baghdadi, the caliph. Notably unmentioned: bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, the owlish Egyptian eye surgeon who currently heads al‑Qaeda. Zawahiri has not pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, and he is increasingly hated by his fellow jihadists. His isolation is not helped by his lack of charisma; in videos he comes across as squinty and annoyed. But the split between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has been long in the making, and begins to explain, at least in part, the outsize bloodlust of the latter.
Zawahiri’s companion in isolation is a Jordanian cleric named Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, 55, who has a fair claim to being al-Qaeda’s intellectual architect and the most important jihadist unknown to the average American newspaper reader. On most matters of doctrine, Maqdisi and the Islamic State agree. Both are closely identified with the jihadist wing of a branch of Sunnism called Salafism, after the Arabic al salaf al salih, the “pious forefathers.” These forefathers are the Prophet himself and his earliest adherents, whom Salafis honor and emulate as the models for all behavior, including warfare, couture, family life, even dentistry.
The Islamic State awaits the army of “Rome,” whose defeat at Dabiq, Syria, will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.
Maqdisi taught Zarqawi, who went to war in Iraq with the older man’s advice in mind. In time, though, Zarqawi surpassed his mentor in fanaticism, and eventually earned his rebuke. At issue was Zarqawi’s penchant for bloody spectacle—and, as a matter of doctrine, his hatred of other Muslims, to the point of excommunicating and killing them. In Islam, the practice of takfir, or excommunication, is theologically perilous. “If a man says to his brother, ‘You are an infidel,’ ” the Prophet said, “then one of them is right.” If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation. The punishment for apostasy is death. And yet Zarqawi heedlessly expanded the range of behavior that could make Muslims infidels.
Maqdisi wrote to his former pupil that he needed to exercise caution and “not issue sweeping proclamations of takfir” or “proclaim people to be apostates because of their sins.” The distinction between apostate and sinner may appear subtle, but it is a key point of contention between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Denying the holiness of the Koran or the prophecies of Muhammad is straightforward apostasy. But Zarqawi and the state he spawned take the position that many other acts can remove a Muslim from Islam. These include, in certain cases, selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes or shaving one’s beard, voting in an election—even for a Muslim candidate—and being lax about calling other people apostates. Being a Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the Koran is to deny its initial perfection. (The Islamic State claims that common Shiite practices, such as worship at the graves of imams and public self-flagellation, have no basis in the Koran or in the example of the Prophet.) That means roughly 200 million Shia are marked for death. So too are the heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law above Sharia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God.
Following takfiri doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people. The lack of objective reporting from its territory makes the true extent of the slaughter unknowable, but social-media posts from the region suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions every few weeks. Muslim “apostates” are the most common victims. Exempted from automatic execution, it appears, are Christians who do not resist their new government. Baghdadi permits them to live, as long as they pay a special tax, known as the jizya, and acknowledge their subjugation. The Koranic authority for this practice is not in dispute.
Musa Cerantonio, an Australian preacher reported to be one of the Islamic State’s most influential recruiters, believes it is foretold that the caliphate will sack Istanbul before it is beaten back by an army led by the anti-Messiah, whose eventual death— when just a few thousand jihadists remain—will usher in the apocalypse. (Paul Jeffers/Fairfax Media)
Centuries have passed since the wars of religion ceased in Europe, and since men stopped dying in large numbers because of arcane theological disputes. Hence, perhaps, the incredulity and denial with which Westerners have greeted news of the theology and practices of the Islamic State. Many refuse to believe that this group is as devout as it claims to be, or as backward-looking or apocalyptic as its actions and statements suggest.
Their skepticism is comprehensible. In the past, Westerners who accused Muslims of blindly following ancient scriptures came to deserved grief from academics—notably the late Edward Said—who pointed out that calling Muslims “ancient” was usually just another way to denigrate them. Look instead, these scholars urged, to the conditions in which these ideologies arose—the bad governance, the shifting social mores, the humiliation of living in lands valued only for their oil.
Without acknowledgment of these factors, no explanation of the rise of the Islamic State could be complete. But focusing on them to the exclusion of ideology reflects another kind of Western bias: that if religious ideology doesn’t matter much in Washington or Berlin, surely it must be equally irrelevant in Raqqa or Mosul. When a masked executioner says Allahu akbarwhile beheading an apostate, sometimes he’s doing so for religious reasons.
Many mainstream Muslim organizations have gone so far as to say the Islamic State is, in fact, un-Islamic. It is, of course, reassuring to know that the vast majority of Muslims have zero interest in replacing Hollywood movies with public executions as evening entertainment. But Muslims who call the Islamic State un-Islamic are typically, as the Princeton scholar Bernard Haykel, the leading expert on the group’s theology, told me, “embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion” that neglects “what their religion has historically and legally required.” Many denials of the Islamic State’s religious nature, he said, are rooted in an “interfaith-Christian-nonsense tradition.”
Every academic I asked about the Islamic State’s ideology sent me to Haykel. Of partial Lebanese descent, Haykel grew up in Lebanon and the United States, and when he talks through his Mephistophelian goatee, there is a hint of an unplaceable foreign accent.
According to Haykel, the ranks of the Islamic State are deeply infused with religious vigor. Koranic quotations are ubiquitous. “Even the foot soldiers spout this stuff constantly,” Haykel said. “They mug for their cameras and repeat their basic doctrines in formulaic fashion, and they do it all the time.” He regards the claim that the Islamic State has distorted the texts of Islam as preposterous, sustainable only through willful ignorance. “People want to absolve Islam,” he said. “It’s this ‘Islam is a religion of peace’ mantra. As if there is such a thing as ‘Islam’! It’s what Muslims do, and how they interpret their texts.” Those texts are shared by all Sunni Muslims, not just the Islamic State. “And these guys have just as much legitimacy as anyone else.”
All Muslims acknowledge that Muhammad’s earliest conquests were not tidy affairs, and that the laws of war passed down in the Koran and in the narrations of the Prophet’s rule were calibrated to fit a turbulent and violent time. In Haykel’s estimation, the fighters of the Islamic State are authentic throwbacks to early Islam and are faithfully reproducing its norms of war. This behavior includes a number of practices that modern Muslims tend to prefer not to acknowledge as integral to their sacred texts. “Slavery, crucifixion, and beheadings are not something that freakish [jihadists] are cherry-picking from the medieval tradition,” Haykel said. Islamic State fighters “are smack in the middle of the medieval tradition and are bringing it wholesale into the present day.”
The Koran specifies crucifixion as one of the only punishments permitted for enemies of Islam. The tax on Christians finds clear endorsement in the Surah Al-Tawba, the Koran’s ninth chapter, which instructs Muslims to fight Christians and Jews “until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.” The Prophet, whom all Muslims consider exemplary, imposed these rules and owned slaves.
Leaders of the Islamic State have taken emulation of Muhammad as strict duty, and have revived traditions that have been dormant for hundreds of years. “What’s striking about them is not just the literalism, but also the seriousness with which they read these texts,” Haykel said. “There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness that Muslims don’t normally have.”
Before the rise of the Islamic State, no group in the past few centuries had attempted more-radical fidelity to the Prophetic model than the Wahhabis of 18th‑century Arabia. They conquered most of what is now Saudi Arabia, and their strict practices survive in a diluted version of Sharia there. Haykel sees an important distinction between the groups, though: “The Wahhabis were not wanton in their violence.” They were surrounded by Muslims, and they conquered lands that were already Islamic; this stayed their hand. “ISIS, by contrast, is really reliving the early period.” Early Muslims were surrounded by non-Muslims, and the Islamic State, because of its takfiritendencies, considers itself to be in the same situation.
If al-Qaeda wanted to revive slavery, it never said so. And why would it? Silence on slavery probably reflected strategic thinking, with public sympathies in mind: when the Islamic State began enslaving people, even some of its supporters balked. Nonetheless, the caliphate has continued to embrace slavery and crucifixion without apology. “We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women,” Adnani, the spokesman, promised in one of his periodic valentines to the West. “If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market.”
In October, Dabiq, the magazine of the Islamic State, published “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” an article that took up the question of whether Yazidis (the members of an ancient Kurdish sect that borrows elements of Islam, and had come under attack from Islamic State forces in northern Iraq) are lapsed Muslims, and therefore marked for death, or merely pagans and therefore fair game for enslavement. A study group of Islamic State scholars had convened, on government orders, to resolve this issue. If they are pagans, the article’s anonymous author wrote,
Yazidi women and children [are to be] divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations [in northern Iraq] … Enslaving the families of the kuffar [infidels] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Koran and the narrations of the Prophet … and thereby apostatizing from Islam.
II. Territory
Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and many other places. Many have come to fight, and many intend to die.
Peter R. Neumann, a professor at King’s College London, told me that online voices have been essential to spreading propaganda and ensuring that newcomers know what to believe. Online recruitment has also widened the demographics of the jihadist community, by allowing conservative Muslim women—physically isolated in their homes—to reach out to recruiters, radicalize, and arrange passage to Syria. Through its appeals to both genders, the Islamic State hopes to build a complete society.
In November, I traveled to Australia to meet Musa Cerantonio, a 30-year-old man whom Neumann and other researchers had identified as one of the two most important “new spiritual authorities” guiding foreigners to join the Islamic State. For three years he was a televangelist on Iqraa TV in Cairo, but he left after the station objected to his frequent calls to establish a caliphate. Now he preaches on Facebook and Twitter.
Cerantonio—a big, friendly man with a bookish demeanor—told me he blanches at beheading videos. He hates seeing the violence, even though supporters of the Islamic State are required to endorse it. (He speaks out, controversially among jihadists, against suicide bombing, on the grounds that God forbids suicide; he differs from the Islamic State on a few other points as well.) He has the kind of unkempt facial hair one sees on certain overgrown fans of The Lord of the Rings, and his obsession with Islamic apocalypticism felt familiar. He seemed to be living out a drama that looks, from an outsider’s perspective, like a medieval fantasy novel, only with real blood.
Last June, Cerantonio and his wife tried to emigrate—he wouldn’t say to where (“It’s illegal to go to Syria,” he said cagily)—but they were caught en route, in the Philippines, and he was deported back to Australia for overstaying his visa. Australia has criminalized attempts to join or travel to the Islamic State, and has confiscated Cerantonio’s passport. He is stuck in Melbourne, where he is well known to the local constabulary. If Cerantonio were caught facilitating the movement of individuals to the Islamic State, he would be imprisoned. So far, though, he is free—a technically unaffiliated ideologue who nonetheless speaks with what other jihadists have taken to be a reliable voice on matters of the Islamic State’s doctrine.
We met for lunch in Footscray, a dense, multicultural Melbourne suburb that’s home to Lonely Planet, the travel-guide publisher. Cerantonio grew up there in a half-Irish, half-Calabrian family. On a typical street one can find African restaurants, Vietnamese shops, and young Arabs walking around in the Salafi uniform of scraggly beard, long shirt, and trousers ending halfway down the calves.
Cerantonio explained the joy he felt when Baghdadi was declared the caliph on June 29—and the sudden, magnetic attraction that Mesopotamia began to exert on him and his friends. “I was in a hotel [in the Philippines], and I saw the declaration on television,” he told me. “And I was just amazed, and I’m like, Why am I stuck here in this bloody room?”
The last caliphate was the Ottoman empire, which reached its peak in the 16th century and then experienced a long decline, until the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, euthanized it in 1924. But Cerantonio, like many supporters of the Islamic State, doesn’t acknowledge that caliphate as legitimate, because it didn’t fully enforce Islamic law, which requires stonings and slavery and amputations, and because its caliphs were not descended from the tribe of the Prophet, the Quraysh.
Baghdadi spoke at length of the importance of the caliphate in his Mosul sermon. He said that to revive the institution of the caliphate—which had not functioned except in name for about 1,000 years—was a communal obligation. He and his loyalists had “hastened to declare the caliphate and place an imam” at its head, he said. “This is a duty upon the Muslims—a duty that has been lost for centuries … The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it.” Like bin Laden before him, Baghdadi spoke floridly, with frequent scriptural allusion and command of classical rhetoric. Unlike bin Laden, and unlike those false caliphs of the Ottoman empire, he is Qurayshi.
The caliphate, Cerantonio told me, is not just a political entity but also a vehicle for salvation. Islamic State propaganda regularly reports the pledges of baya’a (allegiance) rolling in from jihadist groups across the Muslim world. Cerantonio quoted a Prophetic saying, that to die without pledging allegiance is to die jahil (ignorant) and therefore die a “death of disbelief.” Consider how Muslims (or, for that matter, Christians) imagine God deals with the souls of people who die without learning about the one true religion. They are neither obviously saved nor definitively condemned. Similarly, Cerantonio said, the Muslim who acknowledges one omnipotent god and prays, but who dies without pledging himself to a valid caliph and incurring the obligations of that oath, has failed to live a fully Islamic life. I pointed out that this means the vast majority of Muslims in history, and all who passed away between 1924 and 2014, died a death of disbelief. Cerantonio nodded gravely. “I would go so far as to say that Islam has been reestablished” by the caliphate.
I asked him about his own baya’a, and he quickly corrected me: “I didn’t say that I’d pledged allegiance.” Under Australian law, he reminded me, giving baya’a to the Islamic State was illegal. “But I agree that [Baghdadi] fulfills the requirements,” he continued. “I’m just going to wink at you, and you take that to mean whatever you want.”
To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law—being a Muslim adult man of Quraysh descent; exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity; and having ’amr, or authority. This last criterion, Cerantonio said, is the hardest to fulfill, and requires that the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law. Baghdadi’s Islamic State achieved that long before June 29, Cerantonio said, and as soon as it did, a Western convert within the group’s ranks—Cerantonio described him as “something of a leader”—began murmuring about the religious obligation to declare a caliphate. He and others spoke quietly to those in power and told them that further delay would be sinful.
Cerantonio said a faction arose that was prepared to make war on Baghdadi’s group if it delayed any further. They prepared a letter to various powerful members of ISIS, airing their displeasure at the failure to appoint a caliph, but were pacified by Adnani, the spokesman, who let them in on a secret—that a caliphate had already been declared, long before the public announcement. They had their legitimate caliph, and at that point there was only one option. “If he’s legitimate,” Cerantonio said, “you must give him the baya’a.”
After Baghdadi’s July sermon, a stream of jihadists began flowing daily into Syria with renewed motivation. Jürgen Todenhöfer, a German author and former politician who visited the Islamic State in December, reported the arrival of 100 fighters at one Turkish-border recruitment station in just two days. His report, among others, suggests a still-steady inflow of foreigners, ready to give up everything at home for a shot at paradise in the worst place on Earth.
Bernard Haykel, the foremost secular authority on the Islamic State’s ideology, believes the group is trying to re-create the earliest days of Islam and is faithfully reproducing its norms of war. “There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness” about the group’s dedication to the text of the Koran, he says. (Peter Murphy)
In London, aweek before my meal with Cerantonio, I met with three ex-members of a banned Islamist group called Al Muhajiroun (The Emigrants): Anjem Choudary, Abu Baraa, and Abdul Muhid. They all expressed desire to emigrate to the Islamic State, as many of their colleagues already had, but the authorities had confiscated their passports. Like Cerantonio, they regarded the caliphate as the only righteous government on Earth, though none would confess having pledged allegiance. Their principal goal in meeting me was to explain what the Islamic State stands for, and how its policies reflect God’s law.
Choudary, 48, is the group’s former leader. He frequently appears on cable news, as one of the few people producers can book who will defend the Islamic State vociferously, until his mike is cut. He has a reputation in the United Kingdom as a loathsome blowhard, but he and his disciples sincerely believe in the Islamic State and, on matters of doctrine, speak in its voice. Choudary and the others feature prominently in the Twitter feeds of Islamic State residents, and Abu Baraa maintains a YouTube channel to answer questions about Sharia.
Since September, authorities have been investigating the three men on suspicion of supporting terrorism. Because of this investigation, they had to meet me separately: communication among them would have violated the terms of their bail. But speaking with them felt like speaking with the same person wearing different masks. Choudary met me in a candy shop in the East London suburb of Ilford. He was dressed smartly, in a crisp blue tunic reaching nearly to his ankles, and sipped a Red Bull while we talked.
Before the caliphate, “maybe 85 percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives,” Choudary told me. “These laws are in abeyance until we havekhilafa”—a caliphate—“and now we have one.” Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens. In theory, all Muslims are obliged to immigrate to the territory where the caliph is applying these laws. One of Choudary’s prize students, a convert from Hinduism named Abu Rumaysah, evaded police to bring his family of five from London to Syria in November. On the day I met Choudary, Abu Rumaysah tweeted out a picture of himself with a Kalashnikov in one arm and his newborn son in the other. Hashtag: #GenerationKhilafah.
The caliph is required to implement Sharia. Any deviation will compel those who have pledged allegiance to inform the caliph in private of his error and, in extreme cases, to excommunicate and replace him if he persists. (“I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it is a heavy responsibility,” Baghdadi said in his sermon.) In return, the caliph commands obedience—and those who persist in supporting non-Muslim governments, after being duly warned and educated about their sin, are considered apostates.
Choudary said Sharia has been misunderstood because of its incomplete application by regimes such as Saudi Arabia, which does behead murderers and cut off thieves’ hands. “The problem,” he explained, “is that when places like Saudi Arabia just implement the penal code, and don’t provide the social and economic justice of the Sharia—the whole package—they simply engender hatred toward the Sharia.” That whole package, he said, would include free housing, food, and clothing for all, though of course anyone who wished to enrich himself with work could do so.
Abdul Muhid, 32, continued along these lines. He was dressed in mujahideen chic when I met him at a local restaurant: scruffy beard, Afghan cap, and a wallet outside of his clothes, attached with what looked like a shoulder holster. When we sat down, he was eager to discuss welfare. The Islamic State may have medieval-style punishments for moral crimes (lashes for boozing or fornication, stoning for adultery), but its social-welfare program is, at least in some aspects, progressive to a degree that would please an MSNBC pundit. Health care, he said, is free. (“Isn’t it free in Britain, too?,” I asked. “Not really,” he said. “Some procedures aren’t covered, such as vision.”) This provision of social welfare was not, he said, a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy obligation inherent in God’s law.
Anjem Choudary, London’s most notorious defender of the Islamic State, says crucifixion and beheading are sacred requirements. (Tal Cohen/Reuters)
III. The Apocalypse
All Muslims acknowledge that God is the only one who knows the future. But they also agree that he has offered us a peek at it, in the Koran and in narrations of the Prophet. The Islamic State differs from nearly every other current jihadist movement in believing that it is written into God’s script as a central character. It is in this casting that the Islamic State is most boldly distinctive from its predecessors, and clearest in the religious nature of its mission.
In broad strokes, al-Qaeda acts like an underground political movement, with worldly goals in sight at all times—the expulsion of non-Muslims from the Arabian peninsula, the abolishment of the state of Israel, the end of support for dictatorships in Muslim lands. The Islamic State has its share of worldly concerns (including, in the places it controls, collecting garbage and keeping the water running), but the End of Days is a leitmotif of its propaganda. Bin Laden rarely mentioned the apocalypse, and when he did, he seemed to presume that he would be long dead when the glorious moment of divine comeuppance finally arrived. “Bin Laden and Zawahiri are from elite Sunni families who look down on this kind of speculation and think it’s something the masses engage in,” says Will McCants of the Brookings Institution, who is writing a book about the Islamic State’s apocalyptic thought.
During the last years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Islamic State’s immediate founding fathers, by contrast, saw signs of the end times everywhere. They were anticipating, within a year, the arrival of the Mahdi—a messianic figure destined to lead the Muslims to victory before the end of the world. McCants says a prominent Islamist in Iraq approached bin Laden in 2008 to warn him that the group was being led by millenarians who were “talking all the time about the Mahdi and making strategic decisions” based on when they thought the Mahdi was going to arrive. “Al-Qaeda had to write to [these leaders] to say ‘Cut it out.’ ”
For certain true believers—the kind who long for epic good-versus-evil battles—visions of apocalyptic bloodbaths fulfill a deep psychological need. Of the Islamic State supporters I met, Musa Cerantonio, the Australian, expressed the deepest interest in the apocalypse and how the remaining days of the Islamic State—and the world—might look. Parts of that prediction are original to him, and do not yet have the status of doctrine. But other parts are based on mainstream Sunni sources and appear all over the Islamic State’s propaganda. These include the belief that there will be only 12 legitimate caliphs, and Baghdadi is the eighth; that the armies of Rome will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria; and that Islam’s final showdown with an anti-Messiah will occur in Jerusalem after a period of renewed Islamic conquest.
The Islamic State has attached great importance to the Syrian city of Dabiq, near Aleppo. It named its propaganda magazine after the town, and celebrated madly when (at great cost) it conquered Dabiq’s strategically unimportant plains. It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome’s Waterloo or its Antietam.
“Dabiq is basically all farmland,” one Islamic State supporter recently tweeted. “You could imagine large battles taking place there.” The Islamic State’s propagandists drool with anticipation of this event, and constantly imply that it will come soon. The state’s magazine quotes Zarqawi as saying, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify … until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” A recent propaganda video shows clips from Hollywood war movies set in medieval times—perhaps because many of the prophecies specify that the armies will be on horseback or carrying ancient weapons.
Now that it has taken Dabiq, the Islamic State awaits the arrival of an enemy army there, whose defeat will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse. Western media frequently miss references to Dabiq in the Islamic State’s videos, and focus instead on lurid scenes of beheading. “Here we are, burying the first American crusader in Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive,” said a masked executioner in a November video, showing the severed head of Peter (Abdul Rahman) Kassig, the aid worker who’d been held captive for more than a year. During fighting in Iraq in December, after mujahideen (perhaps inaccurately) reported having seen American soldiers in battle, Islamic State Twitter accounts erupted in spasms of pleasure, like overenthusiastic hosts or hostesses upon the arrival of the first guests at a party.
The Prophetic narration that foretells the Dabiq battle refers to the enemy as Rome. Who “Rome” is, now that the pope has no army, remains a matter of debate. But Cerantonio makes a case that Rome meant the Eastern Roman empire, which had its capital in what is now Istanbul. We should think of Rome as the Republic of Turkey—the same republic that ended the last self-identified caliphate, 90 years ago. Other Islamic State sources suggest that Rome might mean any infidel army, and the Americans will do nicely.
After its battle in Dabiq, Cerantonio said, the caliphate will expand and sack Istanbul. Some believe it will then cover the entire Earth, but Cerantonio suggested its tide may never reach beyond the Bosporus. An anti-Messiah, known in Muslim apocalyptic literature as Dajjal, will come from the Khorasan region of eastern Iran and kill a vast number of the caliphate’s fighters, until just 5,000 remain, cornered in Jerusalem. Just as Dajjal prepares to finish them off, Jesus—the second-most-revered prophet in Islam—will return to Earth, spear Dajjal, and lead the Muslims to victory.
“Only God knows” whether the Islamic State’s armies are the ones foretold, Cerantonio said. But he is hopeful. “The Prophet said that one sign of the imminent arrival of the End of Days is that people will for a long while stop talking about the End of Days,” he said. “If you go to the mosques now, you’ll find the preachers are silent about this subject.” On this theory, even setbacks dealt to the Islamic State mean nothing, since God has preordained the near-destruction of his people anyway. The Islamic State has its best and worst days ahead of it.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared caliph by his followers last summer. The establishment of a caliphate awakened large sections of Koranic law that had lain dormant, and required those Muslims who recognized the caliphate to immigrate. (Associated Press)
IV. The Fight
The ideological purity of the Islamic State has one compensating virtue: it allows us to predict some of the group’s actions. Osama bin Laden was seldom predictable. He ended his first television interview cryptically. CNN’s Peter Arnett asked him, “What are your future plans?” Bin Laden replied, “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing.” By contrast, the Islamic State boasts openly about its plans—not all of them, but enough so that by listening carefully, we can deduce how it intends to govern and expand.
In London, Choudary and his students provided detailed descriptions of how the Islamic State must conduct its foreign policy, now that it is a caliphate. It has already taken up what Islamic law refers to as “offensive jihad,” the forcible expansion into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims. “Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves,” Choudary said; without a caliphate, offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph.
Choudary took pains to present the laws of war under which the Islamic State operates as policies of mercy rather than of brutality. He told me the state has an obligation to terrorize its enemies—a holy order to scare the shit out of them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.
Choudary’s colleague Abu Baraa explained that Islamic law permits only temporary peace treaties, lasting no longer than a decade. Similarly, accepting any border is anathema, as stated by the Prophet and echoed in the Islamic State’s propaganda videos. If the caliph consents to a longer-term peace or permanent border, he will be in error. Temporary peace treaties are renewable, but may not be applied to all enemies at once: the caliph must wage jihad at least once a year. He may not rest, or he will fall into a state of sin.
One comparison to the Islamic State is the Khmer Rouge, which killed about a third of the population of Cambodia. But the Khmer Rouge occupied Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations. “This is not permitted,” Abu Baraa said. “To send an ambassador to the UN is to recognize an authority other than God’s.” This form of diplomacy is shirk, or polytheism, he argued, and would be immediate cause to hereticize and replace Baghdadi. Even to hasten the arrival of a caliphate by democratic means—for example by voting for political candidates who favor a caliphate—is shirk.
It’s hard to overstate how hamstrung the Islamic State will be by its radicalism. The modern international system, born of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, relies on each state’s willingness to recognize borders, however grudgingly. For the Islamic State, that recognition is ideological suicide. Other Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, have succumbed to the blandishments of democracy and the potential for an invitation to the community of nations, complete with a UN seat. Negotiation and accommodation have worked, at times, for the Taliban as well. (Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan exchanged ambassadors with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates, an act that invalidated the Taliban’s authority in the Islamic State’s eyes.) To the Islamic State these are not options, but acts of apostasy.
The United States and its allies have reacted to the Islamic State belatedly and in an apparent daze. The group’s ambitions and rough strategic blueprints were evident in its pronouncements and in social-media chatter as far back as 2011, when it was just one of many terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq and hadn’t yet committed mass atrocities. Adnani, the spokesman, told followers then that the group’s ambition was to “restore the Islamic caliphate,” and he evoked the apocalypse, saying, “There are but a few days left.” Baghdadi had already styled himself “commander of the faithful,” a title ordinarily reserved for caliphs, in 2011. In April 2013, Adnani declared the movement “ready to redraw the world upon the Prophetic methodology of the caliphate.” In August 2013, he said, “Our goal is to establish an Islamic state that doesn’t recognize borders, on the Prophetic methodology.” By then, the group had taken Raqqa, a Syrian provincial capital of perhaps 500,000 people, and was drawing in substantial numbers of foreign fighters who’d heard its message.
If we had identified the Islamic State’s intentions early, and realized that the vacuum in Syria and Iraq would give it ample space to carry them out, we might, at a minimum, have pushed Iraq to harden its border with Syria and preemptively make deals with its Sunnis. That would at least have avoided the electrifying propaganda effect created by the declaration of a caliphate just after the conquest of Iraq’s third-largest city. Yet, just over a year ago, Obama told The New Yorker that he considered ISIS to be al-Qaeda’s weaker partner. “If a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant,” the president said.
Our failure to appreciate the split between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and the essential differences between the two, has led to dangerous decisions. Last fall, to take one example, the U.S. government consented to a desperate plan to save Peter Kassig’s life. The plan facilitated—indeed, required—the interaction of some of the founding figures of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and could hardly have looked more hastily improvised.
It entailed the enlistment of Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, the Zarqawi mentor and al-Qaeda grandee, to approach Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State’s chief ideologue and a former student of Maqdisi’s, even though the two men had fallen out due to Maqdisi’s criticism of the Islamic State. Maqdisi had already called for the state to extend mercy to Alan Henning, the British cabbie who had entered Syria to deliver aid to children. In December, The Guardian reported that the U.S. government, through an intermediary, had asked Maqdisi to intercede with the Islamic State on Kassig’s behalf.
Maqdisi was living freely in Jordan, but had been banned from communicating with terrorists abroad, and was being monitored closely. After Jordan granted the United States permission to reintroduce Maqdisi to Binali, Maqdisi bought a phone with American money and was allowed to correspond merrily with his former student for a few days, before the Jordanian government stopped the chats and used them as a pretext to jail Maqdisi. Kassig’s severed head appeared in the Dabiq video a few days later.
Maqdisi gets mocked roundly on Twitter by the Islamic State’s fans, and al‑Qaeda is held in great contempt for refusing to acknowledge the caliphate. Cole Bunzel, a scholar who studies Islamic State ideology, read Maqdisi’s opinion on Henning’s status and thought it would hasten his and other captives’ death. “If I were held captive by the Islamic State and Maqdisi said I shouldn’t be killed,” he told me, “I’d kiss my ass goodbye.”
Kassig’s death was a tragedy, but the plan’s success would have been a bigger one. A reconciliation between Maqdisi and Binali would have begun to heal the main rift between the world’s two largest jihadist organizations. It’s possible that the government wanted only to draw out Binali for intelligence purposes or assassination. (Multiple attempts to elicit comment from the FBI were unsuccessful.) Regardless, the decision to play matchmaker for America’s two main terrorist antagonists reveals astonishingly poor judgment.
Chastened by our earlier indifference, we are now meeting the Islamic State via Kurdish and Iraqi proxy on the battlefield, and with regular air assaults. Those strategies haven’t dislodged the Islamic State from any of its major territorial possessions, although they’ve kept it from directly assaulting Baghdad and Erbil and slaughtering Shia and Kurds there.
Some observers have called for escalation, including several predictable voices from the interventionist right (Max Boot, Frederick Kagan), who have urged the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers. These calls should not be dismissed too quickly: an avowedly genocidal organization is on its potential victims’ front lawn, and it is committing daily atrocities in the territory it already controls.
One way to un-cast the Islamic State’s spell over its adherents would be to overpower it militarily and occupy the parts of Syria and Iraq now under caliphate rule. Al‑Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty to immigrate and serve it. If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State’s obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle. If the state musters at Dabiq in full force, only to be routed, it might never recover.
Abu Baraa, who maintains a YouTube channel about Islamic law, says the caliph, Baghdadi, cannot negotiate or recognize borders, and must continually make war, or he will remove himself from Islam.
And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. The provocative videos, in which a black-hooded executioner addresses President Obama by name, are clearly made to draw America into the fight. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide: irrespective of whether they have givenbaya’a to the caliph, they all believe that the United States wants to embark on a modern-day Crusade and kill Muslims. Yet another invasion and occupation would confirm that suspicion, and bolster recruitment. Add the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers, and we have reason for reluctance. The rise of ISIS, after all, happened only because our previous occupation created space for Zarqawi and his followers. Who knows the consequences of another botched job?
Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it, through air strikes and proxy warfare, appears the best of bad military options. Neither the Kurds nor the Shia will ever subdue and control the whole Sunni heartland of Syria and Iraq—they are hated there, and have no appetite for such an adventure anyway. But they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government failing to bring prosperity to its people.
The humanitarian cost of the Islamic State’s existence is high. But its threat to the United States is smaller than its all too frequent conflation with al-Qaeda would suggest. Al-Qaeda’s core is rare among jihadist groups for its focus on the “far enemy” (the West); most jihadist groups’ main concerns lie closer to home. That’s especially true of the Islamic State, precisely because of its ideology. It sees enemies everywhere around it, and while its leadership wishes ill on the United States, the application of Sharia in the caliphate and the expansion to contiguous lands are paramount. Baghdadi has said as much directly: in November he told his Saudi agents to “deal with the rafida [Shia] first … then al-Sulul [Sunni supporters of the Saudi monarchy] … before the crusaders and their bases.”
The foreign fighters (and their wives and children) have been traveling to the caliphate on one-way tickets: they want to live under true Sharia, and many want martyrdom. Doctrine, recall, requires believers to reside in the caliphate if it is at all possible for them to do so. One of the Islamic State’s less bloody videos shows a group of jihadists burning their French, British, and Australian passports. This would be an eccentric act for someone intending to return to blow himself up in line at the Louvre or to hold another chocolate shop hostage in Sydney.
A few “lone wolf” supporters of the Islamic State have attacked Western targets, and more attacks will come. But most of the attackers have been frustrated amateurs, unable to immigrate to the caliphate because of confiscated passports or other problems. Even if the Islamic State cheers these attacks—and it does in its propaganda—it hasn’t yet planned and financed one. (The Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January was principally an al‑Qaeda operation.) During his visit to Mosul in December, Jürgen Todenhöfer interviewed a portly German jihadist and asked whether any of his comrades had returned to Europe to carry out attacks. The jihadist seemed to regard returnees not as soldiers but as dropouts. “The fact is that the returnees from the Islamic State should repent from their return,” he said. “I hope they review their religion.”
Properly contained, the Islamic State is likely to be its own undoing. No country is its ally, and its ideology ensures that this will remain the case. The land it controls, while expansive, is mostly uninhabited and poor. As it stagnates or slowly shrinks, its claim that it is the engine of God’s will and the agent of apocalypse will weaken, and fewer believers will arrive. And as more reports of misery within it leak out, radical Islamist movements elsewhere will be discredited: No one has tried harder to implement strict Sharia by violence. This is what it looks like.
Even so, the death of the Islamic State is unlikely to be quick, and things could still go badly wrong: if the Islamic State obtained the allegiance of al‑Qaeda—increasing, in one swoop, the unity of its base—it could wax into a worse foe than we’ve yet seen. The rift between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has, if anything, grown in the past few months; the December issue of Dabiq featured a long account of an al‑Qaeda defector who described his old group as corrupt and ineffectual, and Zawahiri as a distant and unfit leader. But we should watch carefully for a rapprochement.
Without a catastrophe such as this, however, or perhaps the threat of the Islamic State’s storming Erbil, a vast ground invasion would certainly make the situation worse.
V. Dissuasion
It would be facile, even exculpatory, to call the problem of the Islamic State “a problem with Islam.” The religion allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the one they choose. And yet simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic can be counterproductive, especially if those who hear the message have read the holy texts and seen the endorsement of many of the caliphate’s practices written plainly within them.
Muslims can say that slavery is not legitimate now, and that crucifixion is wrong at this historical juncture. Many say precisely this. But they cannot condemn slavery or crucifixion outright without contradicting the Koran and the example of the Prophet. “The only principled ground that the Islamic State’s opponents could take is to say that certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid,” Bernard Haykel says. That really would be an act of apostasy.
The Islamic State’s ideology exerts powerful sway over a certain subset of the population. Life’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies vanish in its face. Musa Cerantonio and the Salafis I met in London are unstumpable: no question I posed left them stuttering. They lectured me garrulously and, if one accepts their premises, convincingly. To call them un-Islamic appears, to me, to invite them into an argument that they would win. If they had been froth-spewing maniacs, I might be able to predict that their movement would burn out as the psychopaths detonated themselves or became drone-splats, one by one. But these men spoke with an academic precision that put me in mind of a good graduate seminar. I even enjoyed their company, and that frightened me as much as anything else.
Non-muslims cannot tell Muslims how to practice their religion properly. But Muslims have long since begun this debate within their own ranks. “You have to have standards,” Anjem Choudary told me. “Somebody could claim to be a Muslim, but if he believes in homosexuality or drinking alcohol, then he is not a Muslim. There is no such thing as a nonpracticing vegetarian.”
There is, however, another strand of Islam that offers a hard-line alternative to the Islamic State—just as uncompromising, but with opposite conclusions. This strand has proved appealing to many Muslims cursed or blessed with a psychological longing to see every jot and tittle of the holy texts implemented as they were in the earliest days of Islam. Islamic State supporters know how to react to Muslims who ignore parts of the Koran: with takfir and ridicule. But they also know that some other Muslims read the Koran as assiduously as they do, and pose a real ideological threat.
Baghdadi is Salafi. The term Salafi has been villainized, in part because authentic villains have ridden into battle waving the Salafi banner. But most Salafis are not jihadists, and most adhere to sects that reject the Islamic State. They are, as Haykel notes, committed to expanding Dar al-Islam, the land of Islam, even, perhaps, with the implementation of monstrous practices such as slavery and amputation—but at some future point. Their first priority is personal purification and religious observance, and they believe anything that thwarts those goals—such as causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship—is forbidden.
They live among us. Last fall, I visited the Philadelphia mosque of Breton Pocius, 28, a Salafi imam who goes by the name Abdullah. His mosque is on the border between the crime-ridden Northern Liberties neighborhood and a gentrifying area that one might call Dar al-Hipster; his beard allows him to pass in the latter zone almost unnoticed.
Pocius converted 15 years ago after a Polish Catholic upbringing in Chicago. Like Cerantonio, he talks like an old soul, exhibiting deep familiarity with ancient texts, and a commitment to them motivated by curiosity and scholarship, and by a conviction that they are the only way to escape hellfire. When I met him at a local coffee shop, he carried a work of Koranic scholarship in Arabic and a book for teaching himself Japanese. He was preparing a sermon on the obligations of fatherhood for the 150 or so worshipers in his Friday congregation.
Pocius said his main goal is to encourage a halal life for worshipers in his mosque. But the rise of the Islamic State has forced him to consider political questions that are usually very far from the minds of Salafis. “Most of what they’ll say about how to pray and how to dress is exactly what I’ll say in my masjid [mosque]. But when they get to questions about social upheaval, they sound like Che Guevara.”
When Baghdadi showed up, Pocius adopted the slogan “Not my khalifa.” “The times of the Prophet were a time of great bloodshed,” he told me, “and he knew that the worst possible condition for all people was chaos, especially within the umma [Muslim community].” Accordingly, Pocius said, the correct attitude for Salafis is not to sow discord by factionalizing and declaring fellow Muslims apostates.
Instead, Pocius—like a majority of Salafis—believes that Muslims should remove themselves from politics. These quietist Salafis, as they are known, agree with the Islamic State that God’s law is the only law, and they eschew practices like voting and the creation of political parties. But they interpret the Koran’s hatred of discord and chaos as requiring them to fall into line with just about any leader, including some manifestly sinful ones. “The Prophet said: as long as the ruler does not enter into clear kufr [disbelief], give him general obedience,” Pocius told me, and the classic “books of creed” all warn against causing social upheaval. Quietist Salafis are strictly forbidden from dividing Muslims from one another—for example, by mass excommunication. Living without baya’a, Pocius said, does indeed make one ignorant, or benighted. But baya’a need not mean direct allegiance to a caliph, and certainly not to Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi. It can mean, more broadly, allegiance to a religious social contract and commitment to a society of Muslims, whether ruled by a caliph or not.
Quietist Salafis believe that Muslims should direct their energies toward perfecting their personal life, including prayer, ritual, and hygiene. Much in the same way ultra-Orthodox Jews debate whether it’s kosher to tear off squares of toilet paper on the Sabbath (does that count as “rending cloth”?), they spend an inordinate amount of time ensuring that their trousers are not too long, that their beards are trimmed in some areas and shaggy in others. Through this fastidious observance, they believe, God will favor them with strength and numbers, and perhaps a caliphate will arise. At that moment, Muslims will take vengeance and, yes, achieve glorious victory at Dabiq. But Pocius cites a slew of modern Salafi theologians who argue that a caliphate cannot come into being in a righteous way except through the unmistakable will of God.
The Islamic State, of course, would agree, and say that God has anointed Baghdadi. Pocius’s retort amounts to a call to humility. He cites Abdullah Ibn Abbas, one of the Prophet’s companions, who sat down with dissenters and asked them how they had the gall, as a minority, to tell the majority that it was wrong. Dissent itself, to the point of bloodshed or splitting theumma, was forbidden. Even the manner of the establishment of Baghdadi’s caliphate runs contrary to expectation, he said. “The khilafa is something that Allah is going to establish,” he told me, “and it will involve a consensus of scholars from Mecca and Medina. That is not what happened. ISIS came out of nowhere.”
The Islamic State loathes this talk, and its fanboys tweet derisively about quietist Salafis. They mock them as “Salafis of menstruation,” for their obscure judgments about when women are and aren’t clean, and other low-priority aspects of life. “What we need now is fatwa about how it’s haram [forbidden] to ride a bike on Jupiter,” one tweeted drily. “That’s what scholars should focus on. More pressing than state of Ummah.” Anjem Choudary, for his part, says that no sin merits more vigorous opposition than the usurpation of God’s law, and that extremism in defense of monotheism is no vice.
Pocius doesn’t court any kind of official support from the United States, as a counterweight to jihadism. Indeed, official support would tend to discredit him, and in any case he is bitter toward America for treating him, in his words, as “less than a citizen.” (He alleges that the government paid spies to infiltrate his mosque and harassed his mother at work with questions about his being a potential terrorist.)
Still, his quietist Salafism offers an Islamic antidote to Baghdadi-style jihadism. The people who arrive at the faith spoiling for a fight cannot all be stopped from jihadism, but those whose main motivation is to find an ultraconservative, uncompromising version of Islam have an alternative here. It is not moderate Islam; most Muslims would consider it extreme. It is, however, a form of Islam that the literal-minded would not instantly find hypocritical, or blasphemously purged of its inconveniences. Hypocrisy is not a sin that ideologically minded young men tolerate well.
Western officials would probably do best to refrain from weighing in on matters of Islamic theological debate altogether. Barack Obama himself drifted into takfiri waters when he claimed that the Islamic State was “not Islamic”—the irony being that he, as the non-Muslim son of a Muslim, may himself be classified as an apostate, and yet is now practicing takfiragainst Muslims. Non-Muslims’ practicing takfir elicits chuckles from jihadists (“Like a pig covered in feces giving hygiene advice to others,” one tweeted).
I suspect that most Muslims appreciated Obama’s sentiment: the president was standing with them against both Baghdadi and non-Muslim chauvinists trying to implicate them in crimes. But most Muslims aren’tsusceptible to joining jihad. The ones who are susceptible will only have had their suspicions confirmed: the United States lies about religion to serve its purposes.
Within the narrow bounds of its theology, the Islamic State hums with energy, even creativity. Outside those bounds, it could hardly be more arid and silent: a vision of life as obedience, order, and destiny. Musa Cerantonio and Anjem Choudary could mentally shift from contemplating mass death and eternal torture to discussing the virtues of Vietnamese coffee or treacly pastry, with apparent delight in each, yet to me it seemed that to embrace their views would be to see all the flavors of this world grow insipid compared with the vivid grotesqueries of the hereafter.
I could enjoy their company, as a guilty intellectual exercise, up to a point. In reviewing Mein Kampf in March 1940, George Orwell confessed that he had “never been able to dislike Hitler”; something about the man projected an underdog quality, even when his goals were cowardly or loathsome. “If he were killing a mouse he would know how to make it seem like a dragon.” The Islamic State’s partisans have much the same allure. They believe that they are personally involved in struggles beyond their own lives, and that merely to be swept up in the drama, on the side of righteousness, is a privilege and a pleasure—especially when it is also a burden.
Fascism, Orwell continued, is
psychologically far sounder than any hedonistic conception of life … Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people “I offer you a good time,” Hitler has said to them, “I offer you struggle, danger, and death,” and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet … We ought not to underrate its emotional appeal.
Nor, in the case of the Islamic State, its religious or intellectual appeal. That the Islamic State holds the imminent fulfillment of prophecy as a matter of dogma at least tells us the mettle of our opponent. It is ready to cheer its own near-obliteration, and to remain confident, even when surrounded, that it will receive divine succor if it stays true to the Prophetic model. Ideological tools may convince some potential converts that the group’s message is false, and military tools can limit its horrors. But for an organization as impervious to persuasion as the Islamic State, few measures short of these will matter, and the war may be a long one, even if it doesn’t last until the end of time.
